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RECENT CASES
the treaty as it did. First, there is some doubt as to the existence of the
understanding. 2 Second, it appears that the United States Senate was not
aware of the Message and, in any case, the Senate ratified a treaty and not a
message written in a foreign language. Also, in light of the clear language of
article VI, it cannot be said that its purpose was merely to crystallize for
posterity the existing domicile rules. The treaty, though, must have some
meaning. The most reasonable conclusion then is that the treaty was designed
to assure that the law of the situs of personal property at the time of death
would govern its disposition in cases of conflict of domicile (i.e., concurrent
domicile) where the personal property has been removed after the decedent's
death. Thus, the disposition of movables would be accomplished in an orderly
and equitable manner rather than have the dispositional rights to the movables
depend, as in the instant case, on who got to the property first. This would
also result in the giving "of a suitable respect for the decrees of other civilized
countries. . .3.3, In addition, if article VI is viewed in relation to article
V,34 order and equity in the disposition of an estate3 5 would appear to be
the object36 of this section of the Treaty.
BRUcE D. DRucCR
TORTS-ATTRACTIVE NPIJsANCE-PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE FOR
INJURIES SUFFERED BY A CHILD PLAYING WITH A METAL GRATING IMBEDDED
IN A PUBLIC SIDEWALK
Five year-old George Cuevas, plaintiff in this negligence action, was injured
while playing with several other children on a public sidewalk next door to his
home. Imbedded in the sidewalk was a set of hinged metal gratings covering the
entrance to an unused door leading into the defendant's cellar. The mechanism
by which the gratings could be locked had been broken for about a year prior
to the accident, and the gratings had not been secured in any manner during that
time. Plaintiffs' evidence indicated that neighborhood children played with the
gratings frequently, opening the metal doors and letting them slam shut, and
that the defendants, who were aware of the children's activities, nonetheless did
nothing to correct the situation. Plaintiff was injured while watching a playmate
32. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 196.
33. Instant case at 274, 217 N.E.2d at 645, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 586 (dissenting opinion).
34. See Matter of Schneider, 198 Misc., at 1025, 96 N.Y.S.2d at 660 (Surr. Ct. 1950),
where the court stated that article V defines ". . . the capacity and the power of citizens
of each nation to deal with property located within the borders of the other country."
35. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879) (In a state where aliens were
not permitted to either sell or hold real property, article V was applied so as to give the
Swiss successors the lesser right of selling the real property.).
36. See generally Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931) (In construing treaty
its purpose and the context of the provision in question control.). See also B. Altman
& Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600 (1912) where the court adopted the definition
of a treaty as "a compact made between two or more independent nations, with a
view to the public welfare."
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descend a vertical metal ladder into the vault, when suddenly another child ran
against the open grating, slamming it down on the infant plaintiff's hand. An ac-
tion was brought by the infant for the personal injuries suffered and by his father
for medical expenses and loss of services, against both the property owner and
the street-floor tenants, who operated a grocery business. The Supreme Court,
Bronx County, dismissed the complaint as against all defendants at the close
of plaintiffs' case; the plaintiffs appealed only from the court's dismissal as
against the property owner. Held, affirmed, two judges dissenting. Liability
requires both a dangerous instrumentality and attractiveness to children. A
metal grating in a public sidewalk is a harmless object for which an owner is
not obligated to protect others, even children, who use such harmless objects
to cause themselves harm. Cuevas v. 73rd & Central Park West Corp., 26
A.D.2d 239, 272 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1st Dep't 1966).
The duties of a property owner to one injured on or by his property are
customarily defined according to whether the injured party was, at the time of
the injury, an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.' An invitee is one on another's
property at the invitation of the owner, and the owner has a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent harm to the invitee or the invitee's property.2
"Invitation" is used here in a limited sense and requires that the owner receive
some benefit, usually commercial, from the invitee's presence. This use excludes
the social invitation; a social guest is generally considered to be a licensee rather
than an invitee.4 A licensee is one on another's property with the express or
implied permission of the owner, but without an invitation in the "mutually
beneficial" sense required for an inviteeY An owner is required to refrain from
affirmative acts of negligence with respect to a licensee, and he has a further duty
to warn of any hidden traps or dangerous defects known to the owner, but not
likely to be discovered by the licensee.0 The infant plaintiff in the instant case
was playing on a public sidewalk, where he had every right to be, and con-
sequently cannot be fitted neatly into either category within the usual confines
of these terms. The cases dealing with infants who were injured while on public
ways or thoroughfares have not met the invitee-licensee issue squarely. In
Harkins v. East New York Savings Bank,7 the defendant's overhead fire escape
had a broken latch, allowing it to rest on the public sidewalk adjacent to
defendant's building. The infant plaintiff was climbing the stairway when sud-
denly it began to swing upward, throwing the boy to the pavement. The evidence
1. 65 C.J,S. Negligence § 63(1) (1966).
2. See, e.g., Wilder v. Ayers, 2 A.D.2d 354, 156 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1st Dep't 1956), afl'd,
3 N.Y.2d 725, 143 N.E.2d 514, 163 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1957).
3. Meyer v. Manzer, 179 Misc. 355, 39 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
4. Krause v. Alper, 4 N.Y.2d 518, 151 N.E.2d 895, 176 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1958).
9. Meyer v. Manzer, 179 Misc. 355, 39 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1943). See also 3 Warren,
Negligence in the New York Courts § 1.03, at 205 (2d ed. 1964).
6. Brzostowski v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 16 A.D.2d 196, 199, 226 N.Y.S.2d 464, 468
(4th Dep't 1962).
7. 260 App. Div. 394, 22 N.Y.S.2d 905 (2d Dep't 1940).
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indicated that the latch had been broken for several months and that children
had played on the fire escape frequently during that time. It was held that the
trial court erred in dismissing the complaint as a matter of law, and that a jury
question had been presented. A similar holding is found in Levine v. City of
New York, 8 where the plaintiff was injured on a stairway that was part of a
public thoroughfare. Several children were playing "follow the leader" when the
infant plaintiff slipped and fell, impaling her thigh on a jagged pipe railing which
had broken loose from its mooring. In view of the evidence that children were
known to play on the stairway and that the pipe railing had been broken for
some six years prior to the accident, the Court found that a prima facie case of
negligence had been established, and that the trial court had erred in dismissing
the compaint as a matter of law. In the case of Mysliwiec v. W. Lowentkal Co.,9
involving a boy who was cut by a wire while playing on bales of waste left
in the street by the defendant, a jury verdict for the plaintiff was reinstated
after being set aside by the trial court. The defendant knew that children were
in the habit of playing in the area, and on appeal it was held that the jury
could have found some risk of harm to be reasonably foreseeable in the light
of the evidence. In none of these cases could the injury-producing instrument
be construed as a hidden trap or dangerous defect unlikely to be discovered by
the plaintiff; consequently, it would seem that the standard employed required
simply the ordinary duty to exercise reasonable care in view of the surrounding
circumstances. This, of course, characterizes the duty owed an invitee, and
raises a strong implication that children injured on or by another's property,
when in a public way or thoroughfare, are in effect invitees with respect to the
owner of the property.10
New York courts on occasion have dealt with circumstances similar to those
in the case at bar by applying a standard somewhat resembling the attractive
nuisance doctrine."1 Attractive nuisance provides liability for a child trespasser's
physical injury caused by a dangerous condition on the land, when the possessor
knows children are likely to trespass, the dangerous condition exists, and the
children are unlikely to realize the risk.' 2 The doctrine has been expressly
rejected in New York;' 3 however, it has been applied when the child was injured
on a public highway or thoroughfare, and hence was not a trespasser.1 4 Applica-
tion of the rule has been narrowly limited, and it has been held not to apply
8. 309 N.Y. 88, 127 N.E.2d 825 (1955).
9. 280 App. Div. 852, 113 N.Y.S.2d 289 (3d Dep't 1952).
10. See, Le Roux v. State, 307 N.Y. 397, 121 N.E.2d 386 (1954). See generally, James,
Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 Yale L.J.
605 (1954).
11. Tierney v. N.Y. Dugan Brothers, Inc., 288 N.Y. 16, 41 N.E.2d 161 (1942). See
Hetzel v. Buffalo Cemetery Ass'n, 16 A.D.2d 581, 584, 229 N.Y.S.2d 960, 964 (alternative
holding).
12. Restatement (Second), Torts § 339 (1965).
13. Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N.Y. 110, 19 N.E.2d 981 (1939).
14. Tierney v. N.Y. Dugan Brothers, Inc., 288 N.Y. 16, 41 N.E.2d 161 (1942).
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when the dangerous condition was not in a public way.,; The requirements were
summarized in Parkes v. New York Telephone Co.,' where the court said:
The defendant may not be cast in damages, unless it appears (1) that
the appliance attracted children, (2) that it was inherently dangerous,
or led or attracted the child into or upon another object inherently
dangerous, and (3) that defendant knew or ought to have known both
these things.
17
In the case at bar, liability under this test would require a finding that hinged
iron gratings imbedded in a public sidewalk are, or may be, an inherently
dangerous instrumentality. Objects which are of a destructive nature within
their normal range of operation, 18 such as bombs,' 9 have been considered
inherently dangerous at common law. This list is naturally quite limited; how-
ever, an examination of several New York cases indicates that an object not
"inherently" dangerous may satisfy the dangerous instrumentality requirement
when the surrounding factual circumstances justify such a determination. An
automobile, for example, generally is not considered to be "inherently" dan-
gerous,20 but in Tierney v. New York Dugan Brothers, Inc.,2 1 a parked delivery
truck was held to be a sufficiently "dangerous attraction" to uphold a verdict
for the infant plaintiff. The driver left his unlocked truck with the power off
and the emergency brake set, but he failed to engage the safety switch. Children
climbed into the truck, started it, and the infant plaintiff fell between the mov-
ing vehicle and the curb. The Court of Appeals found a jury question had been
presented. The Court said:
A dangerous attraction in a public highway may impose liability to a
child on the part of the one responsible therefore, because of failure to
exercise due care although there would be no liability if the attraction
were upon private premises where the child had no right to go.
22
An automobile abandoned adjacent to a public street with gasoline remaining
in its tank was "dangerous" enough to result in liability in the case of Parnell
v. Holland Furnace Co.23 The infant plaintiff struck two stones together near
the open tank and was severely injured when the gasoline exploded. A verdict
in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed. The court said:
As to whether it was dangerous to leave the car as it was left with gaso-
line in its tank depends upon surrounding circumstances. The defen-
dant furnace company must have known of the practice of children to
15. Eason v. State, 201 Misc. 336, 104 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Ct. Cl. 1951), afl'd, 280 App. Div.
358, 113 N.Y.S.2d 479 (3d Dep't 1952).
16. 120 Misc. 459, 198 N.Y. Supp. 698 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
17. Id. at 460, 198 N.Y. Supp. at 700.
18. See Cleary v. John M. Marls Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
19. Kingsland v. Erie County Agricultural Soc'y, 298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949).
20. Vincent v. Crandell & Godley Co., 131 App. Div. 200, 115 N.Y. Supp. 600 (2d
Dep't 1909).
21. 288 N.Y. 16, 41 N.E.2d 161 (1942).
22. Id. at 19, 41 N.E.2d at 162.
23. 234 App. Div. 567, 256 N.Y. Supp. 323 (4th Dep't 1932).
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play in the driveway and about the premises .... At least the jury
were entitled to say that they had this knowledge and should have
taken these things into consideration.
24
A similar standard was employed in .aked v. Board of Education of City of
Albany,25 where the infant plaintiff was injured while swinging on an iron gate
in front of a public school. Children had swung on the gate in this fashion for
approximately a year, and school officials made no attempt to discourage such
play. The jury's finding that the officials were negligent in failing to secure the
gate was restored on appeal. A later case was concerned with a brick wall which
had collapsed, killing a student, and it was held that the defefidant was not
negligent since there had been no prior notice that the wall was defective.26
Jaked was distinguished as a case where "the defendant had permitted pupils
to swing upon it [the gate], with knowledge of its defective condition. Since
the danger should have been known, the defendant was liable. 27 It has fre-
quently been held that liability will not result in the absence of either prior
knowledge of the dangerous condition or a reasonable foreseeability of harm.
2 8
Some recent cases, however, indicate that liability may be extended to protect
even the ordinary licensee when both of these requirements are met, despite the
absence of hidden traps or undiscovered defects.
29
In the instant case, the court examined in detail the question of whether
there is a general duty to lock or secure devices imbedded in public sidewalks,
and held the existing duty to be limited to maintaining sidewalk openings so as
not to create an undue risk to pedestrians.8 0 Liability based on any doctrine
akin to attractive nuisance was rejected on the grounds that the iron gratings
were not a dangerous instrumentality,31 and, on this point, Jaked was distin-
guished as a situation in which the defendant was under a statutory duty to
maintain "reasonably safe conditions" for its pupils. The court concluded, in
summary, "that one is not obligated to protect users, including children, who
may use harmless things to cause themselves harm."32 The duty is not evoked
even when "the owner of the harmless things .. .learns of the children's mis-
24. Id. at 570, 256 N.Y. Supp. at 326, 327.
25. 198 App. Div. 113, 189 N.Y. Supp. 697 (3d Dep't 1921), aff'd, 234 N.Y. 591, 138
N.E. 458 (1922).
26. White v. Board of Educ. of Troy, 149 Misc. 324, 268 N.Y. Supp. 12 (Sup.
Ct. 1933).
27. Id. at 326, 268 N.Y. Supp. at 14.
28. See, e.g., Bolsenbroek v. Tully & Di Napoli, Inc., 12 A.D.2d 376, 212 N.Y.S.2o 323
(1st Dep't), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 960, 180 N.E.2d 61, 224 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1961); Schiff v. John
Arborio, Inc., 12 A.D.2d 680, 207 N.Y.S.2d 759 (3d Dep't 1960); Meyers v. 120th Ave.
Bldg. Corp., 9 A.D.2d 931, 195 N.Y.S.2d 163 (2d Dep't 1959), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 871, 182
N.E.2d 291, 227 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1962); Whipple v. State, 282 App. Div. 557, 125 N.Y.S.2d
52 (4th Dep't 1953); Bauman v. Be-Jel Realty Corp., 171 Misc. 845, 12 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup.
Ct. 1939), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 733, 19 N.Y.S.2d 311 (2d Dep't 1940).
29. Brzostowski v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 16 A.D.2d 196, 226 N.Y.S.2d 464 (4th Dep't
1962); Popkin v. Shanker, 36 Misc. 2d 242, 232 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
30. Cuevas v. 73rd & Central Park West Corp., 26 A.D.2d at 241, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 43
(1st Dep't 1966).
31. Id. at 240, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
32. Id. at 242, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
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chievous or playful proclivities." 33 The dissent argued that a duty to protect
non-trespassing children may be created when an owner knows that children
are playing with his "harmless" object in a manner in which some risk of harm
is foreseeable. The cases relied on in the majority opinion were distinguished
on the grounds that "none of the cited cases treats with a situation where
the children had been known by the defendant to be playing, for some time
before the accident, with the particular instrumentality involved." 34 It was
pointed out that dangerous attractions had been found in many cases, 85 in-
dicating that "an article which may ordinarily be harmless, can be turned into
a dangerous instrumentality by the manner in which children handle it."130 On
this reasoning it was maintained by the dissent that a jury question had been
presented.
Many of the countless chafings inevitable in the infinite maze of human
relationships are assessed according to the single broad standard of negligence
law, requiring simply that one exercise reasonable care so as not to cause harm
to others or their property. A variety of refinements have developed over the
years, seeking to further define and clarify this duty within the framework of
particular situations; the attractive nuisance doctrine and the invitee-licensee-
trespasser distinctions exemplify but two of the many familiar attempts. The
benefits to be derived from the use of these classifications is obvious, since the
standards provided are seemingly clear-cut and mechanical within the narrow
limits of their applicability. Frequently, however, the courts are faced with fac-
tual circumstances which fall within the fringe areas of some doctrine, and in
such cases the courts occasionally overlook the fact that negligence doctrines
are, after all, mere attempts to define the fundamental duty to exercise reason-
able care. A recent case dealt with an infant who had fallen into an excavation
located on private property, but only some twenty feet off the public highway.37
The trial court indicated that attractive nuisance principles might be taken
into consideration, but on appeal it was held that the charge to the jury on
this point was confusing and inadequate, for "in the final analysis, the partic-
ular facts of each case applied to general principles of negligence law will de-
termine liability."38 This reasoning had been advanced in Kermarec v. Com-
pagnie Generale39 where the licensee-invitee distinctions were said to have
reached a point such that the increasingly subtle "classifications and sub-classi-
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 247, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
35. The dissent examined in detail the "dangerous conditions" found in Tierney v.
N.Y. Dugan Brothers, 288 N.Y. 16, 41 N.E.2d 161 (1942); Harkins v. East New York Savings
Bank, 260 App. Div. 394, 22 N.Y.S.2d 905 (2d Dep't 1940); Parnell v. Holland Furnace Co.,
234 App. Div. 567, 256 N.Y. Supp. 323 (4th Dep't 1932); and Jaked v. Board of Education
of Albany, 198 App. Div. 113, 189 N.Y. Supp. 697 (3d Dep't 1921), aff'd, 234 N.Y. 591, 138
N.E. 458 (1922).
36. Instant case at 246, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
37. Molnar v. Slattery Contracting Co., 8 A.D.2d 95, 185 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1st Dep't
1959).
38. Id. at 99, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
39. 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
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fications bred by the common law have produced confusion and conflict."
'40
The Court indicated that, as a consequence, "the common law has moved,
unevenly and with hesitation, toward 'imposing on owners and occupiers a
single duty of reasonable care in all the circumstances.' "41
The trend of the law in this direction can be seen both in this state and in
other jurisdictions.42 A pertinent case involved an infant who, with two other
boys, entered the defendant's bottling plant through an open garage door and
asked for a bottle of "Coke" from an employee.43 The request was granted, and
the employee returned to his work. Upon finishing his drink, the youngster walked
to a moving conveyor belt some fifteen feet away and placed his empty bottle on
it. The bottle began to fall through a hole in the belt; the plaintiff attempted to
retrieve it and caught his arm in the conveyor machine. It was held, in the Ap-
pellate Division, that the child was a licensee since there was an implied consent
to remain upon the premises, and that liability was possible should the moving
conveyor belt be found to have been a trap. Judge Halpern, speaking for the
court, then rejected the requirement that a trap be found, saying:
Indeed, in the case of injury to a child licensee, it is not necessary
to use the characterization of a "trap" in order to sustain a recovery.
The duty of the occupier of the premises may be stated in terms of a
duty to exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. 44
In the instant case, the infant plaintiff's status as either an invitee or a licensee
was not established by the court. It has been suggested earlier that the infant
plaintiff was, in effect, an invitee, and as such was owed the duty of reasonable
care in all the circumstances. Even if the court had found that the child was a
bare licensee, he was owed substantially the same duty if we accept the reasoning
in the Coca-Cola case. A consideration of these issues would have acknowledged
the current trends with regard to landowners' and occupiers' liability toward
children; furthermore, it would have relieved the court of the semantic difficulties
encountered in applying the attractive nuisance doctrine within the rather un-
certain limitations of its acceptance in New York.
45
MAX E. SCHLOPY
40. Id. at 631 (dictum).
41. Ibid., quoting in part from Chief Judge Clark's dissent in the Circuit Court, 245
FP2d 175, at 180 (2d Cir. 1957).
42. Lyshak v. City of Detroit, 351 Mich. 230, 88 N.W.2d 596 (1958); Brzostowski v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 16 A.D.2d 196, 226 N.Y.S.2d 464 (4th Dep't 1962).
43. Brzostowski v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra note 42.
44. Id. at 210, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
45. Id. at 203, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 472, where Judge Halpern suggests that attractive
nuisance does apply, after all, only to trespassing children.
